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1. Introduction
Sociology of knowledge constituted, as an extremely reflective field of knowledge research, 
in the first half of the twentieth century.1 However, all the way until the first decade of the 
twenty‐first century, it has been unclear what really makes the specific problems of sociology 
of knowledge. Sociology of knowledge is also neglected today, in the first half of the twenty‐
first century. But why is that? We should be careful of simplified answers, however, for easier 
resolution of the meaning of the upcoming text; we should use some categorical, constative 
statements. To make it simple, we are in the anti‐epistemological situation because this situa‐
tion is not shaped by epistemology, but rather it is shaped by the new knowledge economics 
as a false replacement for epistemology. In such situation, it is hard to find vocabulary in 
which it would be possible to ask adequate questions relating to that situation, and it is even 
1It is believed that the founder of sociology of knowledge is Karl Mannheim. After the translation of his capital work 
Ideologie und Utopie to English, there were fruitful assumptions for critical research of knowledge made, in the fields 
of new sociology of knowledge, sociology of ideology, sociology of science and technology, epistemology of science, 
social epistemology, epistemology of economics, epistemology of legal sciences, epistemology of mathematics, and so 
on. However, it seems that not even in the twenty‐first century epistemological situation in social sciences and scientific 
research in general (that was, say, according to the thinking of “theorists of addiction” catastrophic) was not recognized 
as a foundational problem of the survival of mankind. However, as we will see in the last pages of this chapter—and 
further—it seems that the epistemological situation is gradually changing because we are searching for new episte‐
mological communities. In the twenty‐first century, fields such as sociology of knowledge, social epistemology, and 
epistemology of social sciences are truly becoming interesting interference fields for many marginalized researches from 
“undeveloped countries” and “developing countries.” For many researchers who deal with paradoxes of development, 
paradoxes of economic globalization, and such—that is, asymmetrical development of whole continents, regions, and 
zones—social sciences are found in an epochal milestone. They are found on a milestone for many scientists, scientific 
rookies, researchers, activists who deal with questions of epistemological colonialism, cultural imperialism, inside colo‐
nialism, racism, discrimination, post‐colonial studies of science and technology, not only in Latin America, Asia, Africa, 
but throughout epistemic‐free areas of knowledge that search for emancipated intellectual areas in which genuine cos‐
mopolitan conversation of mankind would be possible.
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harder to think that we could offer or even have answers that would be operative in educa‐
tion or some other practice. According to the warnings of many specialists from the field of 
education theory, already in the progressivist vocabulary, which we use when we talk about 
development, we may observe the anti‐epistemological, anti‐educational trends. Trends that 
speak of unlimited, linear progress, growth, and development simply are not correct. The 
remainder of this chapter has a task to explain, at least in short bullets, how it is possible that 
thorough disciplines, which were responsible for studying social conditions of knowledge 
by their vocation, all the way up to the second half of the twenty‐first century, did not make 
a more significant cognitive impact on the society itself. Simply said, epistemology of sci‐
ence, sociology of knowledge, sociology of science, technology and education, as well as other 
critical and reflective disciplines that process knowledge and education, are truly neglected. 
Instead of those disciplines, the main word in the knowledge things is already led by the 
so‐called the new knowledge economics. With the help of financial institutions, institutions 
of subtle and less subtle supervision and control, with the help of administrative bureaucratic 
procedures of evaluation and self‐evaluation of study programs, which must be written in the 
new economics, progressivist language of management and marketing, the new economics of 
knowledge (and skills) has successfully colonized, hegemonized, oppressed, and completely 
erased the emancipated vocabularies and emancipated potentials of social sciences. Critical 
social sciences are, with the excuse that higher education must be “adapted to the market needs”, 
placed in a humiliating position—a position of slaves of the neoliberal ideology.
2. Marginalization of sociology of knowledge as a symptom of 
epistemological crisis of science in the age of postglobalism
The main reason for marginalization of sociology of knowledge, and fields of research related 
to it, is that the subject field of research of social sciences (and this is the global society) is com‐
pletely colonized by the progressivist ideology and vocabulary of the new knowledge eco‐
nomics. This is the symptom of epochal epistemological crisis of social sciences in the twenty‐first 
century. This chapter searches for at least one sentence in which it would be possible to pledge 
for creation of new intellectual areas in which it is possible to speak about complex relations, 
in an alternative way, between knowledge‐science‐education‐development‐ideology‐new media 
 environment and living environments. In her book, Connected Sociologies, Gurminder K. Bhambra 
follows the critical tradition of Wright Mills and Alvin W. Gouldner, and she persuasively 
criticizes Ulrich Beck, Michael Mann, and Immanuel Wallerstein. The final result of the works 
of these authors have been famous because of their criticism toward dominant systems of 
knowledge in the West, Bhambra recognized in the impossibility that these authors—such 
great and significant critics of the West paradigms of development—throw away their prints 
(conceptual blueprints) of Eurocentrism. Bhambra suggests creating connected sociologies. 
Those would be sociologies that could preserve pluralism of local experiences. Without a thor‐
ough read, and special sensibility for injustice, we should not think that it could be crystal 
clear to us in which way these local connections, only on the grounds of local experiences 
and intellectual experience of the postcolonial studies, but without some greater institutional 
Epistemology and Transformation of Knowledge in Global Age2
and symbolic noble power, could or should correct the multi‐century discursive domination 
of main flows of social theory. In order for these local connections, local fields of knowl‐
edge could impact the future directions of development of sociology of globalization. This still 
remains to be seen. In every case, it seems that one such book still, in some way, outlines 
new ways of understanding global society and offers hope in the future of social sciences, as 
Raewyn Connell states. However, what do we do with the new economics of knowledge and 
information in global society of knowledge, if the global knowledge society threatens to turn 
into global society of asymmetrical supervision on production and reproduction of knowl‐
edge and information? The problem of justification or self‐legitimization of what is called the 
“new knowledge economics” consists of the fact that the new knowledge economics has an 
institutional power and forceful administrative‐political and supervisory means, with which we 
may state that it is based on knowledge, without any scientific or logical evidence for such 
statement.
Since sociology of knowledge has been neglected in the main flows of social sciences until 
the second half of the twenty‐first century, it did not, even later with the flare of “globaliza‐
tion,” have a greater institutional or cognitive impact on educational processes and processes 
of internal or external evaluation or self‐evaluation of those processes that were conducted 
under the trademark of new knowledge economics that should have been the foundation on 
which free and prosperous global society of knowledge is built. It is devastating that the inter‐
connected field of knowledge, such as philosophy of science, epistemology of social sciences, 
social epistemology, sociology of knowledge, sociology of science and technology, sociol‐
ogy of information society and cyber culture, and so on could not have a significant impact 
on newer reforms of high and higher education. Therefore, simply said, even sociology of 
knowledge, as many other close critical researches on science and ideology, could not have 
almost any impact on theoretical and methodological trends and movements in economy, society, 
politics, and such. Under the general term sociology of knowledge, we may find very important 
groups of synchronic and diachronic connected topic, intellectual impacts from the past and 
highly demanding symbolic interactions between different, older and newer, research fields 
that deal with theories and practices of knowledge. Or, even with corporative use or misuse of 
what may be called “knowledge,” in any communication‐clear context of epistemic discus‐
sion, through justified or unjustified faith or belief. It is therefore possible to differentiate 
classical sociology of knowledge, founded by Kall Mannheim, in the first half of the twentieth 
century, and the new sociology of knowledge, which is primarily connected with the sociology of 
globalization.2 However, both classical and new sociology of knowledge are closely related on 
mutually unclassified fields of critical reflection which may be conducted in a sign of philoso‐
phy of social sciences, social epistemology, or something similar.
2Sociology of globalization leans on the tradition of Western rationalist philosophy and, consequentially, on the linear, 
progressivist understood conception of development. The main concepts of globalization are thought of in the West, 
with the goal for their use as the universal order of words and things. That is, before all, a symbolical order of discourse 
that is euphemistically named global society of knowledge (skills, information, and such). The problem (not challenge) 
is that the Western concepts of globalization are only ostensibly pluralist and only ostensibly pluri‐perspectivist. They 
are founded on a diabolic heritage of scientific rationalism, individualism, comodification, hedonism, epistemic progres‐
sivism, techno‐centrism, technophilia, total management, militarism, rigmarole, consumerism, economist application of 
the idea of freedom, and ideologically applied (in fact discriminated) concept of human rights.
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3. Sociology of knowledge and paradox of development in an 
approach of “new knowledge economics”
At the end of the second decade of the twenty‐first century in philosophy and epistemology of 
social sciences, in sociology of knowledge, in social epistemology, and especially in econom‐
ics theories and politics of development (in their immanent logics of measuring development), 
as well as in logics of synchronic and diachronic classification of social and economic reality 
in which we live in, we are missing an adequate concept of knowledge and what we actually mean 
by development—“Development,” which would be worthy of that name. Knowledge is better 
than ignorance and, it is assumed, that knowledge is developing. It is assumed that in this 
way the general knowledge on meaning of the concept of knowledge itself is developed, as the 
knowledge of the meaning of development is developed. That is, we should become subject to 
an equal cosmopolitan discussion led between equally communicating individuals—mem‐
bers of epistemological community of the global society of knowledge. Progress, growth, and 
development are truly wonder words of the West Enlightenment and rationalism. To many, 
they are weird, tragicomic, obscure, sensitive, symptomatic, slippery, and such. However, 
indeed, those are the key determinants of privileged explanation of modern “progress”—
progress that leads to economic and financial globalization and to globalization of knowl‐
edge as such. But, what is knowledge indeed? Is it maybe some fashion such as “Eurosong”? 
Or, should such question be understood, evaluated, and disregarded simply as wrong, as 
wrongly asked question? Who decided about what knowledge is, and who knows what should 
be decided when defining differences between knowledge and justified or unjustified belief? Is 
all knowledge equal? In what relationship are theory of knowledge and practice of applica‐
tion of knowledge? In what relationship are theory and practice (and theory of practice)? How 
do knowledge and power, knowledge and ideology mutually function? There are no simple 
answers to these questions, as there are no simple answers to question of globalization being 
a Western project. Where is the West? “It is not clear to me. In all parts of the world there is 
a place where the Sun comes up and the opposite, where the Sun comes down. If we are in 
Tokyo, for example, Beijing is west, where the Sun comes down, therefore in the West [1]” 
Economists, who believe in the neoliberal economics, as the new knowledge economics, are 
mostly pragmatic, especially in the twenty‐first century. They did not overwork themselves 
thinking about overly hard socially epistemological, methodological, and geo‐epistemologi‐
cal questions about relationships between knowledge and power. They were not writing for 
an overly long period of time, such as Spinoza, about relationships between theology and eth‐
ics. They did not exhaust themselves with figuring out puzzles about scientism, quantophre‐
nia, and qualitative methodology. They actually used the time after the philosophers made an 
early pronunciation of “the death of philosophy,” and then they successfully invented lucra‐
tive phrase “new economics of knowledge and skills” and placed it in drive, in the market 
where only the strong ones win. They have placed that phrase in the duty of economics and 
“social construction of reality.” Economics practitioners, and even economics who lecture 
economics as a science (subjects from the field of social sciences), tried to neutralize as much 
as possible, to infinitely mathematize the subject (object) of economics, even though it should 
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be clear to everyone that economics is a social, and not a natural science.3 In such a way, they 
have shown that they are working on an epistemologically slippery field—in the middle of a 
growing chasm—a chasm that is growing between economics theory, practice, and politics. 
This enabled them to completely neglect the epistemological and methodological assump‐
tions of own “scientific” impact acting as if the epistemological and socially epistemologi‐
cal problems in economics theory, practice, and politics do not even exist. Economists and 
militant ideologists of progress have adopted the word knowledge and announced it (privileged) 
ownership of the new economics of knowledge (and information). Economic entrepreneurs 
of knowledge took the concept of knowledge in their own hands and announced it their own 
asset, a resource rather, on which the new knowledge economics decides. In this way, the 
knowledge is reduced to only one dimension, the economic one. Only one, significantly lim‐
ited view of knowledge, is announced as a universal foundation upon which should be built 
a building of the global society of knowledge. They have cunningly announced how we are 
living—that is, how we should live—in the global society of knowledge and skill. One such 
diagnosis has become so generally accepted, so that every criticism of the new knowledge of 
economics today risks of being announced subversive, that is, dangerous for the reproduction 
of the dominant regime of knowledge.
If we go back to past, we also may speak of marginalization of sociology of knowledge. Even 
after Louis Wirth and Edward Shils translated Mannheim’s Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction 
to the Sociology of Knowledge, sociology of knowledge in USA carried a stigma of over abstract‐
ness, impracticality, and burden of the philosophical—hermeneutic—epistemological reflec‐
tion and relativism. Conceptual schemes of sociology of knowledge were burdened with 
theory, abstract, overly fluid, and reflexive. They were not possible to be directly applied in 
research or business practice. It seems that such books were not of any use, and this opinion 
still reigns even after 2008, even though it is obvious that economics was found in a collapse. 
It was like that even earlier, for many decision makers in higher education institutions and 
universities. It seemed that philosophical and sociological books, which study and research 
socially epistemological and methodological foundations of what we call knowledge in vari‐
ous contexts, were not necessary. Books on knowledge, written by sociologists of knowledge, 
such as Mannheim, could not have had a ready answer to the universal question of what 
3In this way, they showed that they are working on an epistemologically slippery field—in the midst of a growing 
chasm—a chasm that grows between economic theory, practice, and politics. Economists, with the help of new knowl‐
edge economics, construed a pragmatic, operative difference between the term know and skill know‐how. This enabled 
them to completely neglect the epistemological and methodological assumptions of own “scientific” action, acting as 
if epistemological and socially epistemological problems in economic theory, practice, and politics do not even exist. 
Economists and military ideologist of progress have adopted the word knowledge and announced it (privileged), and 
ownership of the new economics of knowledge (and information). Economic entrepreneurs of knowledge have taken 
the term knowledge in their own hands and announced it their own, that is, a resource, about which the new knowledge 
economics decides. In this way, knowledge is reduced to only one dimension, the economics one. Only one significantly 
limited view of knowledge is announced as the universal foundation upon which we could and should build the build‐
ing of the global society of knowledge. They cunningly announced the way we live—that is, the way we should live—in 
the global society of knowledge and skill. One such diagnosis has become generally accepted that even today, each 
criticism of the new knowledge economics risks of being announced subversive, that is, dangerous to the reproduction 
of the dominant regime of knowledge.
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knowledge is before time, and this was evident in the way of asking questions as well as the 
way of searching for answers. This is why neither the sociology of knowledge in the twentieth 
century nor the epistemology of globalization could have been forced as a socially impacting 
intellectual field, even though, in nature of asked questions, they deal with dynamic question‐
ing of the meaning of knowledge in the social context.
As Florian Znaniecki tried to explain later on, sociology of knowledge is not a “sociological 
theory of knowledge,” because, in that case, sociology could have been found in an unusual 
position. As a theory of knowledge, “the science of other sciences” must have determined its 
own character in sociology, while it, as sociology, would determine its own character as “the 
science of all sciences.” Naming these subtle differences, Znaniecki (See Ref. [2]) believed 
that in a non‐problematic way, he could clear position of sociology of knowledge in a becom‐
ing society. However, since the 1980s and 1990s of the twentieth century, that is, since the 
time when hyperinflation of shallow writing on globalization came into place, it has become very 
clear that the so‐called global society of knowledge does not favor criticism, doubt, nor asking 
new sociological and epistemological questions about foundation upon which the building of the 
new knowledge economics is built. Znaniecki wrongly believed that there is no need to argue 
about the word knowledge. He stated that many arguments could have been avoided if we 
had completely formed “science about knowledge.” However, it is impossible to establish 
a universal science about knowledge. This is why the new knowledge economics, always 
and in every place where it wants to pretend in a universal character of its limited discourse 
about knowledge, transforms into quasi‐sciences, which has the power of competition with 
definitions of knowledge just because it in itself represents a result of symbolic and real 
domination of the neoliberal ideology of global capitalism. We are surely talking about a 
globally forced quasi‐science, the new economics of knowledge, skills, information, and 
such.4 This is an approach that, with the help of the world financial institutions and Western 
educational institutions, was placed as a universal science, as the science of all sciences, and as a 
fundamental social ontology of the twenty‐first century that has, almost unnoticed, encased 
into the structure of language itself, into the vocabulary we use to explain the world we live 
in. The new knowledge economics is, in fact, a “modern success story.” This is how, in an 
unbreakable semantic relationship with management and manufacturing of knowledge, a 
great guru Peter Drucker has cunningly/lucratively marked it in his wrongly titled work 
Post‐Capitalist Society.5 In the chapter, The Third World, the author writes: “This book focuses 
on the developed countries – on Europe, on the United States and Canada, on Japan and 
the newly developed countries of the ‘Third World’. This is not because I consider the less‐
developed nations unimportant or even less important. That would be folly. Finally, two 
thirds of the global population lives in the third world, and until the time when the present 
4It is an approach that, with the help of world financial institutions and Western education institutions, forces as the uni‐
versal science, the science of all sciences. As a fundamental social ontology of the twenty‐first century, that has, almost 
without notice, snuck in the narrative structure of language, in the vocabulary by which we explain the changes and the 
world we live in.
5In the first chapter, under the title “From Capitalism to Society of Knowledge,” Drucker writes: Today, knowledge re‐
lates to and is applied only to knowledge itself. It is the revolution of management. Knowledge, today, quickly becomes 
an exclusive factor of manufacturing, pushing aside both capital and labor force. It may be too early (and definitely 
forced) to call our society the “society of knowledge”; for now, we only have the economics of knowledge. However, our 
society is surely post‐capitalist….. This transformation is surely become a radical change in the meaning of knowledge.
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period of transitions comes to an end (about 2010 or 2020), the third world will be home to 
a three quarters of the population. However, I also believe that is very probable that during 
the next decade or two, there will be the new and startling ‘economic miracles’ where the 
poor and fallen behind countries of the world are being transformed, literally over night, 
into economic forces that are recording growth. It is even possible, Drucker claimed then, 
that it would be far more of such transformations that there were in the last 40 years or so, 
since when we first started to talk about social growth [3]” It was necessary to include this 
long citation because of what we will mention in the main part of this chapter in the context 
of an opposing thesis: a thesis that the neoliberal conception of development, from start until 
today, was wrong, in order for it to finally transform into one of the most dangerous ideolo‐
gies of the twenty‐first century.
Drucker’s words are an educative paradox about globalization and we cited them in order to 
emphasize one enormous discrepancy: a discrepancy between the Great promise (expressed by 
the great guru, founder of management) and the Great disappointment. Disappointment for 
what was happening, not only in the Third world but worldwide, since 1993 (when Post‐capital‐
ist Society was published) and until today. In more recent times, the doubt in the Great promise 
given during the 1990s has grown. The doubt is in the promise that we will, as mankind, in the 
limitless global world, and on foundations of the new cognitive economics based on knowl‐
edge (and only knowledge), soon step into the global society of knowledge and information 
where we will finally all be happy and satisfied because we live in a unique world with no 
limits, “most beautiful of all possible worlds.”
Georges Gurvitch, in one text from 1971 [4], has expressed a belief that it could come as occur‐
rence of other forms and types of knowledge in the future. He was right. That is why he 
stated that we cannot start our research of concrete relationships (regardless of whether it is 
about manifesting sociality, certain groups, groups of such groups in countries and churches, 
social classes, or global societies of different types) unless we take primarily more precise and 
more detailed analyses of knowledge types and their connections with forms of knowledge. 
Even though the sentence above sounds very abstract, I believe that it is useful to remind our‐
selves how classical sociologists seriously approached the topic of knowledge. On the contrary, 
from economists, for example, who were talking about the new knowledge economics or about 
the global society of knowledge and skills, and almost never, at least to my knowledge, showed 
the need to previously define own epistemological and methodological assumptions, or to 
explain what they actually think with the term knowledge. On the contrary to that, Gurvitch 
shows special caution for the use of terms. He believes that certain types of knowledge, espe‐
cially the perceptual knowledge about the outside world, as well as knowledge about the 
Second and about the We, about groups, classes and so on, political knowledge, certain groups 
of expert knowledge that came out of natural sciences (astronomy, physics, biology, and such) 
or humanities (including history and sociology), require studying specific space and time in 
which the study objects are moving.
Neoliberal spaces of knowledge as well as neoliberal politics of knowledge and truth are 
using colonial logics of “free market” and anti‐epistemological systems of knowledge that are 
totally destructive for human beings and nature. Neoliberalism transforms ideas of freedom, 
democracy, and education reducing them actually only to neoliberal economics. For human 
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beings to be able to live together, and in peace, with other human beings, it is necessary to 
educate ideas, concepts, and terminology in which it is possible to differentiate relations sci‐
ence‐knowledge‐education‐society‐rest of the world. Neoliberal knowledge economics represents 
an anti‐educational concept, in which it is not possible to educate concepts about ourselves 
and our world, nor it is possible, in the frame of the language of the new knowledge econom‐
ics, to truly make freedom serious as well as true potentials of a man as a citizen of the world. 
From that, there is a foundational tension between philosophy of social sciences, sociology of 
knowledge, social epistemology (pluralist and anti‐colonial approaches), and the new knowl‐
edge economics. The new knowledge economics has put itself in a privileged epistemological 
position. The new knowledge economics thesis states that only neoliberal economics based 
on knowledge, technologies, and information may lead to creation of the global society of 
knowledge.
There are many ways in which neoliberal paradigm of globalization and the “new knowledge 
economics” serve as a quasi‐epistemological basis for creation of the so‐called global society 
of knowledge—impacts not only the spreading of neoliberal ideology in the field of social sci‐
ences but also education in mathematics, science, and technology in undeveloped countries. 
Paul Ernesto, from Exeter University, believes that dominant effects, achieved through ways 
in which research institutions, organizations, and scientific publications from Northern and 
“developed” countries, usually Anglophonic, dominate the international research commu‐
nity and education, are multiple, but they are economic and ideological before all. It is basic 
that there is export of university education from Western countries into Eastern countries 
and “developing countries.” There is an asymmetrical economic effect, that is, asymmetrical 
inflow of knowledge and specialty to “developing countries.” With that, there is a certain 
ideological effect. What is called an ideological effect is seen in that the import (that is) export 
of knowledge, skills, specialties, and research methodologies always also follows a set of 
implicit values, along with epistemological and ideological orientations. There is an interna‐
tional regulation (and promotion and marketing) of products of educational research through 
international bodies, conferences, and related publications.
In mathematical education, there are international coordination bodies, such as the International 
Commission on Mathematical Instructions (2001) that organizes conferences and study proj‐
ect, including organizations ICME, PME, HPM, organizations IOWME and conferences, and 
independent series of conferences (e.g., MES, ALM, and CERME) that gather researchers from 
many countries. An asymmetrical economic effect, Ernesto claims, does not represent a sur‐
prise. We may agree with such an opinion. An asymmetrical economic effect does not represent 
a surprise because we are used to living in a deeply unfair ideological world. We are probably 
used to living in such a world because we got used to that it is normal that the new knowledge 
economics (by definition) is based on trade of goods and sales of knowledge. Western and 
“developed” countries, in this way, may dominate manufacturing and guarantee (warranty) 
of knowledge of high value. They achieve that through control of highly prestigious publica‐
tions and conferences and through forced Eurocentric epistemologies, Eurocentric methodol‐
ogy, and standards. Standards perform the function of insurance and keepers of those values 
through forced educational practices of their application. Such kind of “distorted trade,” as it 
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would be called by a French philosopher and sociologist of media, Jean Baudrillard, always 
and again leads to an ideological effect. Ernesto, therefore, truly masterfully observes how 
researchers in developing countries internationalize ideological and epistemological assump‐
tions and values of such dominant research culture. Further, “drain of brains” from undevel‐
oped and poor countries into developed countries is used for recruiting talented migrants. 
Such individuals simply cannot resist accepting good working conditions and good conditions 
of intellectual development that do not exist in undeveloped nor developing countries [5]. In 
this way, developed countries, through exploitation of position of undeveloped countries, are 
ensuring assumptions for own economic progress. Globalization, consumerism, and ideology 
are all parts of the same semiotic system—system that does not acknowledge epistemic limita‐
tions of growth. Without consumerism, as a universal secular religion, ideology, and pathology, 
globalization would be impossible. Without globalization, as an ideology and religion of a 
consumer society, pathology of consumerism would not be possible.
4. Sociology of knowledge and vocabulary for the new era
The first decade of the twenty‐first century has unwound in the sign of a dominant discourse 
about globalization. There were different discussions led on that topic, all until we started 
talking about “postglobalism” and the collapse of the neoliberal globalization of the world. 
The feeling of collapse has been emphasized after 2008, when there was an economic‐finan‐
cial crisis that shook the trust in the “new knowledge economics.” For that new insightful 
economics, that stated for itself that it was based on knowledge, it was believed that—with 
the help of technology, new media, and mathematical models of explication of its explana‐
tions—it may function as an inviolable cognitive foundation and an instrument for creation 
of the global society of knowledge. However, this has been shown as an illusion. Even though 
through main flows of opinion in the West, the new economics was represented as a saving 
solution that (apparently) ensures the future of mankind, the crisis has destroyed a significant 
part of earlier economic‐deterministic dreams. The phrase, which is the new knowledge eco‐
nomics that we keep repeating very often on purpose, is often expressed as self‐understand‐
ing. This is because a great number of people believe that economic knowledge is important 
for the whole world and not just for narrow groups of economics students. It would be hard, 
except in an ironic way, to dispute the statement that knowledge is more valuable and more 
important of ignorance. It is believed that scientific knowledge is more superior to other forms 
or types of knowledge. Science is a valuable social activity because it represents the result of 
the intellectual, theoretical, practical, and research work of many individual scientist and sci‐
entist teams in time and space. Time and space of their work may be named on the foundation 
of various mechanisms of differentiation which do not have to be purely scientific, because there 
is no such thing as pure science. Also, we should warn about the danger of anti‐science. In 
the second decade of the twenty‐first century, the most different anti‐scientific and populists 
movements are thriving. The best way to defend against populism should be critically ori‐
ented science and social epistemologies of individual sciences in the context of understanding 
true problems of development.
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What can we even think about and in which categories of patterns do we think in? If we think 
in progressivist, techno‐scientific categories of progress, growth, and development, it is clear 
that we think in globally privileged categories of the “new knowledge economics.” Exactly 
because of this progressivist, privileged character of the new‐economic vocabulary—which is 
recycled in the same intensity even after 2008—it has been shown that it is almost impossible 
to criticize the Bologna reform of education. Just as every criticism of the Bologna reform of 
higher education is turned against the one making it (as shown by Konrad‐Paul Liessmann 
in Theorie der Unbildung: Die Irrtümer der Wissensgesellschaft [6])—similarly—everyone who 
dares to criticize the new‐economic concept of development is exposed to the risk of being 
accused of anti‐science (or even something more dangerous). This is why it is necessary to 
not give up from the task of manufacturing of cosmopolitan public knowledge about positive 
and negative dimensions of global development. It is necessary to search for new intellectual 
areas of knowledge in the context of application of epistemology of reflective rationalism (at the 
same time connecting global, regional, and local knowledge and experiences of the world). 
This means that it is necessary to epistemologically unite all epistemic units in genuine areas 
of knowledge. However, this union could only occur from one (still inadequately justified) 
unconditional respect of orders for universal responsibility. This knowledge should occur from 
responsible search for those knowledges about globalization that would, from its inside order 
for truth, come to true knowledge—knowledge that would indeed be worthy of that name. 
Craig Calhoun and Michel Wieviorka write: “If researchers in social sciences, regardless of 
their numerous differences, should unite, what could be the purpose of their engagement? 
What would be the reason of such worth for them to flow in to those risks? The answer is 
simple, at least in theory. This purpose and reason are concerned with the truth itself, truth 
about social life. This seemingly innocent answer is not at all fashionable, and still, it is about 
truth. It is never certain, it can always variate depending on accepted perspective, and it could 
be expressed through many different shades, in many different languages. Even though, it is 
legitimate to criticize the pretention for absolute truth, we cannot doubt the important signifi‐
cance of infinite search for fair understanding and well justified insight. [7]”
Wiebke Keim, Ercüment Çelik, Christian Ersche, and Veronika Wöhrer deal with the manu‐
facture of world knowledge. Those who are excluded are humiliated. They give special atten‐
tion to theoretical and epistemological reconfiguration of social scientists and humanities in 
the light of postcolonial criticism of knowledge. At the same time, they also provide a strong 
criticism of Eurocentrism. They took rigorous criticism of modern state of social sciences, 
naming series of limitations in Eurocentric epistemological approaches. They have included 
India, America, South Africa, Australia, and Europe [8].
Massimo Pollifroni, in his works, focuses on epistemological analysis of globalization and on 
paradoxes of globalization of discourse. He believes that globalization is a project of world 
integration of economics that has negative consequences. For him, epistemological problem 
represents what is in the vocabulary of economics known as corporatized and mostly sense‐
less, because we cannot determine the meaning of some circulating economic terms. This 
is why he is close to making a statement that such imprecise discourse leads to dangerous 
discrepancy between theory and reality, but also to real violence and injustice. He criticizes 
corporatization of terms, that is, the vocabulary of economics, stating that there is resistance 
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to globalization through the “new ethical feeling.” Therefore, he believes that we are already 
living in the “postglobal era.” He is convinced that the economists in the twenty‐first century 
will be obliged to have this “ethical feeling” directed against negative social effects of overall 
corporatization of society. He is convinced that the economic vocabulary must be changed, 
as well as methodological instruments and the incumbent accounting techniques [9]. Graeber 
claims that capitalism, in its final, stultifying study, shifts from poetic to bureaucratic tech‐
nologies. With poetic technologies, Graeber means using rational, technical, and bureaucratic 
means for realizing free and unbelievable fantasies. Today, however, Graeber claims there 
is something completely opposite going on. It is not about encouraging vision, creativity, and 
final free fantasies. It is about making those fantasies “stay afloat”; we do not even pretend any‐
more that it is possible to shape or embody them. In the meantime, those few fields, in which 
freedom, imaginative creativity are truly nurtured, such as development of Internet software 
of open code, are used, finally, to make a more efficient platform for filling forms. By this, we 
mean “bureaucratic technologies”: administrative imperative, which are not means but aims 
of technological development, claims Graeber [10].
It is known that we owe to Foucault the far‐reaching observation that the historical epochs are 
not different in the fact that people who belonged to those epochs thought, but they are differ‐
ent in the fact of what was possible to be thought in a given epoch. Foucault wrote about changes 
in “episteme”—they were not simple systems of classification, but rather a deep logic on the 
foundation on which different classifications may be construed. Characteristics of different 
episteme are discrete rules of separation and connection between things for more on topic, 
see Ref. [11]. Already three centuries of discipline techniques, training, and management have 
tried to force knowledge that has to be gained and transferred, as knowledge worthy of that 
name. In that sense, every society, and even global society of knowledge and information, has 
its own regime of truth, its own politics of truth, its own strategies of extortion of recognition 
of what surely is knowledge and truth. Knowledge, power, and truth are the words—as Paul 
Veyne claims—that have impressed Foucault. It is not that there should be some kind of furi‐
ous triad between those three terms. It is mostly to explain in what relationship these terms 
were in different systems of knowledge, different discursive regimes, and different regimes 
of truth. However, the special question is what did the thinker of archeology do, what did he 
want to do and achieve, with his impressions about knowledge, power, discourses, and classifica‐
tions? What did he do with words and things? What meanings did he make when he played 
with that famous classification of animals? Did he run away from truth or did he want to get 
close to something we call truth? All in all, for Foucault, thought is essentially connected with the 
fight and not with the mind for more on topic, see Ref. [12]. His credit is in this, in the formation 
of one specific geo‐epistemology of human knowledge. Could the archeology of knowledge 
be applied onto the dominant knowledge about consumerism, western image of globaliza‐
tion? It seems that globalization is the final phase of thought whose representatives do not 
want to give up from the progressivistic understanding of development—despite that it has 
not been clear for a long time in which direction we—as an epistemic community—are actu‐
ally moving.
It would be good if the book, for example, Educating the “Right Way. Markets, Standards, God, 
and Inequality,”[13] written by Michael Apple, could influence more careful questioning of the 
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meaning of development. The named book could be insightful, primarily, because it questions 
not only the progressivistic economic thesis about development but also the ruling general 
thesis about neutrality of knowledge and technology in the age of domination of economic model 
of development. Apple believes that the starting statement about neutrality of knowledge is sim‐
ply not correct. Question about knowledge, about whose knowledge is, whom it belongs to, who 
chooses it, and how does one justify it, represents a constitutive question for understanding 
the paradox of globalization. When we think about whose knowledge is, we should try to think in 
different directions. It seems that today, and today lasts too long, no one at all may show were 
forward is. Could knowledge go backward, in paradox terms? Where is that forward? It seems 
that also the ontological dimension is the future colonized by economic discourse about the 
infinite, limitless development. How can we, in progressivist language of the new knowledge 
economy, speak of progress or improvement of our systems of knowledge? To make it even 
more concrete: how can we, with the same progressivist language of economic “science” write 
our syllabi? Who are we, as a global epistemic community writing our syllabi to when we 
anticipatively speak of expected learning outcomes—of objectives—of methodologies? The leading 
structure of understanding—“discourse” (discussion)—determines what may and what may 
not be known. It determines what we may let slide as the “truth” and “real” and what is lost as 
a “myth,” “made up.” Is it actually power rather than knowledge—power that is found in the 
foundation of discourse about globalization and connected to colonialism, racism, sexism, and 
hegemony? And if it is, in what way is it happening and why is there so little and rarely talked 
about? for example, see Refs. [14–16] After multi‐decade, radical crisis of economic paradigms 
of knowledge—that were included on the inside in the education building of the global soci‐
ety of knowledge—we need different, alternative perspectives of naming people, things, and 
events. I am sure that we are standing in front of a long‐term task of constructing new pro‐
grams of work that would be directed toward the epistemological and moral recovery of social 
sciences, and I think especially of the new information economics of knowledge and skills. The 
task consists of how we should learn to forget what it is learned wrongly and learn how to 
learn from the start. For a long time, it was necessary to educate different imaginary meanings of 
time and space. In many places, there is free intellectual space missing, a space for free think‐
ing and understanding of the irreplaceable educational role of social studies and humanities. 
Considering the positive and negative experiences of different ideologies, it is necessary to 
reconstruct vocabularies of social sciences and humanities that have become overly techno‐
cratic and instrumental. Sociological and philosophical opinion must not become instrumen‐
tal or dogmatic. It must shape the new critical opinion of the world and the man in that world. 
It must take over historical responsibility for that tough intellectual task.
Until the end of this chapter, we should—in the context of expressing symbolic resistance 
toward the dominant economic‐political‐militaristic scheme of development—try to point to 
the complex interconnection between knowledge and power. This connection was unmasked 
also by Teun A. Van Dijk, when he wrote: “That which is considered knowledge in any period 
or community is determined by the one who has power to define and determine the truth 
within a society (public opinion, church, media and science). This argument will also correctly 
predict that if certain minorities, dissidents, or individuals express beliefs that they find (or 
even justify) to be the truth, they will not be believed, or their knowledge will be disregarded 
as just an opinion, or they will be prevented to express their own beliefs [17].”
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It is known that since the creation of philosophy, critical thinking faces dangers of misunder‐
standing of complex relations and co‐relations between science, philosophy, theology, and so 
on. It is the same today. Because, we, as human beings, without consolation of universal theol‐
ogy, as theology of all possible theologies (regardless of the fact that something like that does 
not and could not exist), could not probably know, but we could maybe only believe that we 
know “who the one is” who could eternally answer the hardest philosophical, sociological, 
metaphysic, theological question, which is: who does the future belong to?
Ecological pollution of the earth, air, and water represents the greatest possible global threat 
of survival on earth. Only danger from nuclear catastrophe could measure up to this prob‐
lem. Commercial media rarely present the ecological threat in public, as a global ecological 
threat that endangers life on earth. It is rarely spoken of that we may already be late for cor‐
rect understanding of the meaning of growth in order for our relationship toward nature 
and ourselves to change—and to timely prevent this catastrophe from happening. Moreover, 
there still are a large number of those who believe that ecological problems are false problems, 
that is, made up. However, sociologists and other responsible scientists are aware that the 
danger of ecological catastrophe is extremely large: “Environmental problems have become 
such a emphasized line of social life in the twenty‐first century that sociologists would have 
to try very hard to find any empirical topic that would not, in this way or that way, be under 
their influence [18]. If sociological researches do not include consideration of ways in which 
social and natural systems overlap, their explicative value will be lowered,” claim Randolph 
Haluzy‐Delay and Debra J. Davidson. This means that finding efficient answers to ecological 
threats will depend on, before all, the competency and courage of our educational institu‐
tions (institutes and universities before all) to execute a decisive epistemological reconstruction 
of all our “systems of knowledge.” We should, before all, find ways to stop commercial‐cor‐
porative, hegemonic trends, and practices in order for all social sciences to be submitted to 
economic model of a man (homo oeconomicus). In order for this to be possible, it would prob‐
ably be necessary to educate the wider consensus that our human activity is rooted at the 
same time not only in the economic but also in social, political, economic, and geo‐epistemic 
constructions that all together have the same earthly foundation. Global epistemological situ‐
ation in sciences never depends only on science and scientists. Epistemological situation also 
depends on institutional environment. That is, on complete social conditions and ways in 
which people, who are not scientists, perceive what scientists do. However, the problem is 
in that administrative‐bureaucratic specialization (differentiation) of various areas of science 
does not let broader integrations (de‐differentiation) of various areas. Some bold scientists, 
through their own creativity and dedication, try to point to epistemic and institutional limi‐
tations of the new corporative science that is dangerous to survival of the research commu‐
nity itself. However, is there such a thing as a global epistemological situation and global 
epistemic community? Before we even try to answer to those questions, someone may think 
that we should search for answers to other questions that are not purely sociological, purely 
philosophical, or purely epistemological, but they deal with the possible meaning of “emerg‐
ing society,” that is, global society of knowledge in the twenty‐first century. Pessimists believe 
that until there are large differences in material and financial resources dealt with by various 
epistemological communities (where it is already implied that a unique socially epistemologi‐
cal community does not exist), it would be very hard to speak of a common epistemological 
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foundation of sociology of knowledge about globalization. Regardless of that, I believe that 
the new sociology of knowledge, which is emerging right at the moment, owns cognitive 
capacities for far‐reaching criticism of what we called knowledge about development and 
progress. Epistemological crisis of knowledge creates circumstances in which it becomes clear 
that we should definitely ask ourselves over again: in what way, and in which conceptual 
categories, we should analyze our life in order to, on the foundation of those analyses, be able 
to improve it.
After 40 years or so of very fruitless discussions about postmodernism, and after almost 30 
years of discussing globalization, there is a feeling of satiety from epistemological and moral 
relativism contained in those discussions. Postmodernism will remain remembered by its 
distrust toward definitions and toward meta‐narrations, while globalization will remain 
remembered as the greatest possible meta‐narration. A meta‐narration that, because of its 
fake plurality, we almost did not even recognize as a falsely “successful” meta‐ narration. We 
say falsely successful because that narration, it seems, with the help of symbolic capital of 
the new knowledge economy, has “successfully” replaced almost all other narrations about 
development.
It is necessary to re‐actualize the question of limitations of economic growth. Without the initial 
change of perspective, without new concepts, that is, without new meanings that we assign to 
old terms (e.g., progress, growth, and “development”), we probably cannot understand that in 
the foundation of all crises (which we painfully face at the end of the second decade of the 
twenty‐first century) there is a social‐epistemological crisis of meaning, that is, crisis of utiliza‐
tion of terms which we got used to (by mistake). However, this is not the end of the story. It 
should be the new beginning. There are already certain epistemologically un(certain) attempts 
made, to outline foundational conceptual tools to advocate for a different society. Different from 
this in which we live in, therefore, it is necessary to emphasize possible meanings of the term 
degrowth. This term is, at the same time, used in at least threefold meaning: (1) as a synonym 
for renewal of utopian energies, (2) as the fastest growing global social movement, and (3) as 
a term for conceptual frame with which we differently show the transformation and utilization 
of energy and materials on planet Earth; social structures that use a part of that energy; those 
management mechanisms that direct that use [19]. They say, when we can express what we 
want with everyday language, we need a new conceptual frame, that is, different conceptual 
scheme. With the term degrowth, we wish to strongly mark distancing away from the impera‐
tive of growth. All institutions were created by collective action of people, so their good and 
bad sides are something we must take responsibility for. This is how courageous researchers 
believe, researchers that work together on creation of vocabulary for the new era. There are 
a series of terms in the vocabulary. Their meanings should be explained. Unfortunately, we 
do not have enough time to explain all these terms in one chapter, such as this one, the one 
we think of as an experiment. This is why we will name only several of those terms and their 
central meanings. The term “décroissance” (a French term for degrowth) was first used by a 
French sociologist Andre Gorz 1972. He asked many questions about the balance of Earth, 
material manufacturing, and capitalism that are found even today in the core of discussions 
about what is degrowth, and what could it mean. The following term in the vocabulary for the 
new era is anti‐utilitarianism. It is a worldview that criticizes predominance of epistemologi‐
cal starting points of economics in humanities and social sciences. Anti‐utilitarianists criticize 
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utilitarianism because it impairs a human being. Social metabolism—this term describes a pat‐
tern of material and energetic flows that may be connected with expression of functions and 
reproduction of structures of human society. Similar to metabolism of living beings, which 
need a certain sequence of complex chemical reactions in their bodies in order for them to 
function, the term social metabolism describes a named sequence for replenishment of the 
society itself. Environmental justice relates to the right that an individual may stay in a place 
and environment that he/she belongs to, protected from uncontrolled investment and growth, 
contamination, land usurpation, speculative investments, de‐investments, collapse, and 
neglect. To this, we should add movements for environmental protection and political ecology—
an approach that combines ecology and political economics, in order to deal with questions 
of relationships between society and natural resources, and between social groups and classes 
that have a different, unequal approach to these resources (and who use them differently). 
Autonomy—a brave Greek sociologist Cornelius Castoriadis defines autonomy as an ability to 
enforce laws and rules upon ourselves, either consciously or unconsciously. Decolonization of 
the imaginarium—a key term for criticism of imperialism. If growth and development are beliefs, 
and therefore “imaginary meanings” (Castoriadis), such as “progress” and all other founda‐
tional categories of economics, to get out of them, to leave them, to overcome them, to can‐
cel them (famous Hegelian Aufhebung), which means that imaginarium should be changed. 
Therefore, realization of a just society means decolonization of our imaginarium. De‐materializa‐
tion relates to a decrease (actually enormous decrease) of the amount of raw materials used in 
order to satisfy the needs of manufacturing and consumption of our planet. De‐materializa‐
tion emphasizes that (a large part) of our social metabolism must be decreased. Social limitations 
of growth and social limitations—a thesis on social limitations is foundational for understanding 
of the meaning of the term “degrowth.” It is not only an issue that growth will not last forever 
and that it is becoming uneconomical because of its social and ecological expenses. It is about 
that growth is “un‐smart,” a goal without reason, a search for the elusive dream [20]. Due to 
the limitations of space, we will name just other few most significant conceptual terms. Terms 
with which we emphasize the paradox of economic globalization (and paradoxes of the “new 
knowledge economics”), hoping that, perhaps even before the global catastrophe, they may be 
used as the vocabulary for the new era. Here are these terms (in footnotes, we name authors 
whose definitions we used, or unknowingly modified, for the purpose of this chapter6): 
New economics, Simplicity, Jevons paradox (rebound effect), Energy, Entropy, Hubbert’s 
peak theory, Capitalism, Co‐modification, Conviviality, Pedagogy of catastrophe, Growth, 
Care, Happiness, Common goods, Digital common goods, World sharing, Direct democracy, 
Ecological communities, Indignados (Occupy), Employment guarantee, Public money, Local 
6List of authors whose definitions we used to create a preliminary draft of the vocabulary for the new era: Onofrio Ro‐
mano, Mauro Bonaiuti, Joshua Farley, Arturo Ascobair, Alevgul H. Sorman, Isabelle Anguelovski, Susan Paulson, Joan 
Martinez‐Alier, Marco Deriu, Dan O’Neill, Serge Lotouche, Sylvia Lorek, Onofrio Romano, Erik Swyngedouw, Giorgos 
Kallis, Sergio Ulgiati, Christian Kerschner, Samuel Alexander, Blake Alcott, Diego Andreucci, Terrence McDounough, 
Erik Gomez‐Baggethun, Marco Deriu, Joan Martinez‐Alier, Marta Condre, Mariana Walter, Serge Latouche, Peter A. 
Latouche Peter A. Victor Filka Sekulova, Silke Heifrich, David Bollier, Mayo Fuster Morell Juliet B. Schor, Christos Zo‐
grafos, Claudio Cattaneo, Viviana Asara, Barbara Muraca, B. J. Unti, Mary Mellor, Kristofer Ditmer, Rita Cavario, Iago 
Otero, Xavier Renou, Tim Jackson, Samuel Alexsander, Giacomo D. Alisa, Giorgos Kallis, Sergi Cutillas, David LIistar, 
Gemma Tarafa, Chris Carlsson, Denis Bayon, Isabelle Nadia Johaniosova, Ruben Surinach Padilla, Eduardo Gudinas, 
Philippa Pary, Eduardo Gudynas, Chiara Corazza, Solomon Victus, Antonella Piccho, Mogobe b Romose Giacomo D 
Alisa, Giorgos Kallis, Federico Demaria.
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currencies, Disobedience, Basic and maximum income, Postnormal science, Revision of debt, 
Cooperatives, Buen vivir, Economics of Stability, Feminist economics, Ubunty, From saving 
measures to dépensea. It is paradoxical that, considering final ambivalent effects of techno‐
scientific and information development, main current in social sciences in the twenty‐first 
century are not, say, connectionist organized critical studies of science and technology. These 
studies could advocate trans‐disciplinary, trans‐continental, anti‐imperialistic, and decoloniz‐
ing character of new social sciences. They could be in an infinite balanced phronetic commu‐
nication with cosmopolitan‐defined public sphere. These studies should be the main focus of 
reconfiguration and reconstruction of globalization. They could, say, in a socially responsible 
way, explain current events in sciences, especially epistemological events related to debates 
about nature of “rationality,” “objectivity,” and value neutrality of knowledge and technol‐
ogy, in different contexts dealing with life and violent, biotechnologically (and tele‐techno‐teo‐
teleo‐ logically) manufactured death of people, and communities.
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